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ELIGIBLE CLAIMANTS UNDER LUMP SUM AGREEMENTS
RICHARD B. LrLLct
Under traditional international law, "the first essential of an in-
ternational claim is a showing that the claimant is entitled to the pro-
tection of the state whose assistance is invoked." 1 Since, as stated by
the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Panevezys-Saldutisk-
is Railway Case, "it is the bond of nationality between the State and the
individual which alone confers upon the State the right of diplomatic
protection,"2 generally the person with the underlying private grievance
forming the basis of the claim must demonstrate that he is a national of
the claimant state.' As recently as last year the Department of State
acknowledged "the long established policy of the United States Govern-
ment not to espouse formally claims of persons who were not citizens of
the United States when their claims arose."4 It added that this policy
rested upon universally accepted principles of international law and,
moreover, that "as far as the Department knows [it] has been regularly
followed by Western countries in their postwar settlements with Com-
munist countries."5
Although lump sum agreements have settled the vast bulk of postwar
claims, with the exception of a short monograph by Litmans,8 and sections
in the standard works on nationalization by Foighe' and White,8 little
attention has been paid to the effect they may be having on customary
international law norms, especially on the threshold question of eligi-
bility.9 The purpose of this article, based upon a survey of one-half
t Professor of Law and Director, International Legal Studies, Syracuse University
College of Law. Director, Procedural Aspects of International Law Institute.
1. 5 G. HACKWORTIH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 802 (1943).
2. Case of the Panevezys-Saldutiskds Railway, [1939] P.C.IJ., ser. A/B, No.
76, at 16. But see Advisory Opinion on Reparation for Inquiries, [1949] I.C.J. 181.
Compare text at and accompanying note 3 infra.
3. See 8 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTFRNATIoNAL LAW 1233-68 (1967). Occasion-
ally nonnationals may claim a state's protection. See id. at 22-30.
4. Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to Contemporary [sic]
Law, 61 Am. J. INT'L L. 101, 105 (1967).
5. Id. The Department has admitted but one exception to this policy. 8 M.
W.ITEmAN, supra note 3, at 1238.
6. M. LITMAN, THrE INTERNATIONAL LUMp-Sum SETTLEMENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES (1962).
7. See I. FOIGHEL, NATIONALIZATION AND COmPENSATION 229-46 (1964) [herein-
after cited as FOIGHEL].
8. See G. WHITE, NATioNALisATioN OF FOREIGN PROPERTY 51-70 (1961) [herein-
after cited as WHITE].
9. The attempts by the Harvard Law School's drafters and the International
Law Commission's Special Rapporteur to reformulate the law of state responsibility
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the ninety-odd lump sum settlements concluded since World War II, is to
examine the major eligibility provisions in these agreements and compare
whatever trends may appear with the traditional international law rules."0
Since in many instances a bare textual analysis of an agreement's article
on eligibility might produce a distorted picture of the persons allowed to
claim under it, whenever possible this article encompasses data obtained
from earlier studies of the practice of American" and British 2 national
claims commissions, which have construed numerous such provisions in
the course of distributing funds to their respective nationals, plus infor-
mation derived from a study of French postwar practice now in
progress.'"
I. ELIGIBILITY OF INDIVIDUALS
Most lump sum settlements specifically state that the distribution of
the fund falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the claimant
country, 4 but that discretion generally is limited by eligibility provi-
sions contained in the agreement itself. 5 These provisions vary con-
siderably in detail. At one extreme, such as the agreement between Nor-
way and Poland, they actually set forth the individual claims to be
allowed."0 At the other extreme, an example being the recent settlement
both ignore the effect of such arguments. See Lillich, Toward the Formulation of an
Acceptable Body of Law Concerning State Responsibility, 16 SYRAcusE L. Rav. 721,
735-36 (1965). The final version of the American Law Institute's Restatement, how-
ever, does give them considerable weight, especially on the eligibility question. See
RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 171, Reporters'
Note 2, at 519 (1965), and RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 172, Reporters' Note 2, at 524 (1965). See also H. BRIGGS, LA PROTECTION DIP-
LOMATIQUE DES INDWIDUS EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL: LA NATIONALITL DES RECLAMA-
TIONS 76-98 (Institut de Droit International 1963), which cites them extensively.
10. A mimeographed list of these agreements through December 1, 1967 is
available from the writer. Eventually they will be published in English in a treatise by
LILLICH & WESTON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR SETTLEMENT BY LuMp Sum
AGREEMENTS (1970). For a preliminary article bearing the same title as the proposed
treatise see INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LIBER AmiCORUm FOR MARTIN DOMKE 143
(P. Sanders ed. 1967).
11. R. LILLICH & G. CHRISTENSON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR PREPARATION
AND PRESENTATION ch. I (1962). See also R. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR
ADJUDICATION BY NATIONAL CoMMISSIONS cl. III (1962).
12. R. LiLLICa, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: PoSTWAR BRITISH PRACTICE ch. II
(1967). This chapter originally appeared in shortened form as The Jurisprudence of
the Foreign, Compensation Commission: Eligible Claimants, 13 INT'L & ComP. L.Q.
899 (1694). See generally F. VALLAT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PRACTITIONER chs.
I1-III (1966).
13. Weston, Postwar French Foreign Claims Practice: Adjudication by National
Cominssions-An Introductory Note, 43 IND. L.J. 832 (1968).
14. See, e.g., Article 7 of the Agreement Between France and Czechoslovakia,
June 2, 1950, Decree No. 51-1286 of Nov. 7, 1951, [1951] J.0. 11188.
15. See, e.g., Article 2 of the Agreement with Yugoslavia, July 19, 1948, 62 Stat.
2658, T.I.A.S. No. 1803. Cf. FoIGnHr- 265.
16. Schedule A of the Agreement Between Poland and Norway, Dec. 23, 1955,
[1955] Stortingets prp. No. 103.
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between the Netherlands and Indonesia, they provide only that the claims
of "nationals" are to be compensated, giving the claimant country wide
latitude in determining just what persons are eligible."' A majority of
the agreements, however, take a middle-of-the-road approach, falling un-
der one of several different categories.
Initially, all the agreements, like the French-Polish settlement which
provides for the compensation of "individuals of French nationality,"' 8
reiterate the traditional rule that only nationals of the claimant country
are entitled to share in the distribution of the lump sum.'" They differ
considerably, however, with respect to the requirement of continuous
nationality, a rule of customary international law stipulating "that a claim
be continuously owned from the date the claim arose, and at least to the
date of presentation, by nationals of the state asserting the claim."'"
A few agreements, the one between the United States and Yugoslavia
being a convenient example, apparently dispense with the continuity
principle, requiring only nationality "at the time of the nationalization or
other taking. . . ."" An occasional agreement makes nationality man-
datory only "at the date of signature of the present Agreement...,""
a liberalization that permits the allowance of the claims of so-called "late
nationals."" Only a half-dozen settlements, such as the recent Canadian-
Bulgarian agreement, spell out the continuous nationality rule in its
17. Articles (1), (6) of the Agreement Between the Netherlands and Indonesia,
Sept. 7, 1966, [1966] Tractatenblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden No. 199.
18. Article 4(a) of the Agreement Between France and Poland, March 19, 1948,
Decree No. 51-1288 of Nov. 7, 1951, [1951] J.O. 11190.
19. Cf. FOIGHREL 231 n. 16. An interesting clause in the Greek-Yugoslav agreement
excludes from its eligibility provisions "claims of nationals of one of the Contracting
Parties who are domiciled outside its territory. . . ." Article 1 (2) (a) of the Agreement
Between Greece and Yugoslavia, June 18, 1959, 368 U.N.T.S. 9. Thus, contrary to most
lump sum settlements, domicile as well as nationality is made a condition of recovery
under this agreement. Compare WHITE 56: "The possession of the nationality of the
claimant State at the material time was the only condition laid down by the com-
pensation agreements. In none of them was the State of residence of the alien claimant
referred to."
20. 8 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 3, at 1241.
21. Article 3 of the Agreement with Yugoslavia, note 15 mupra. The word
"apparently" deserves emphasis in view of the fact that the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission read this agreement to require continuous nationality "from the date the
claim arose to the date the agreement was signed." FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT
ComIIsSION, SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS BY THE FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMMISSION
OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS PREDECESSORS 58 (1955). Compare Article 3 of the
Agreement Between France and Hungary, June 12, 1950, Decree No. 52-1079 of Sept.
23, 1952, [1952] J.O. 9260, discussed by Weston, supra note 13, at 849.
22. See, e.g., Article 2 of the Agreement Between Sweden and Yugoslavia, Jan.
17, 1963, [1963] Sveriges Overenskommelser Med Frammande Makter No. 6. See also
Article 2 of the Agreement Between Belgium and Czechoslovakia, Sept. 30, 1952, [1966]
Moniteur Beige 9296, mentiond in 8 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 3, at 1238.
23. See generally R. LILLICH, supra note 12, at 29-30.
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traditional form.24
The great bulk of the agreements, while not restating the rule,
approximate it by requiring that the claimant have been a national on the
date the international wrong took place and on the date of signature of
the agreement" or the date of its entry into force.26 Requiring con-
tinuity of nationality right through to the effective date of the settlement,
in the words of Foighel, "appears somewhat inappropriate. It can very
easily happen that alterations in ownership, due to change of nationality
or inheritance, can take place after signing."2 In view of the length
of time between the accrual of claims and the negotiation of agreements
settling them, it is reasonable to expect that a number of individual
claimants will die during the additional period between the signing of an
agreement and its effective date.2" To the extent that their claims are
disallowed because they pass to nonnational heirs or legatees, this stretch-
ing of the continuity of nationality rule appears not only unnecessary but
also unreasonably harsh.
When, as in the vast majority of agreements, the gist of the con-
tinuous nationality rule is separated somewhat artificially into two inde-
pendent requirements, namely, nationality on the date of loss and nation-
ality on the date the agreement is signed, an amelioratory construction
appears possible which would avoid some of the problems occasioned by
the loss of nationality after a claim's accrual. While in most situations
the individual who originally suffered the loss has owned the claim
continuously thereafter, it is apparent that "he who applies for compen-
sation and he who suffered the loss need not be identical; the claimant
may be the successor in title of the expropriated owner."" In the latter
case the two-pronged test would require nationality of both the original
24. "For the purpose of the present agreement, claims of Canada [sic] citizens
and of Canadian juridical persons refer to claims which were owned by Canadian
citizens or by Canadian juridical persons on the effective date of nationalization,
expropriation or other similar measure and conti~m sly thereafter until the date of the
present agreement." Article III of the Agreement Between Canada and Bulgaria, June
30, 1966, 18 EXTERNAL AFFAIRS 340 (1966) (emphasis added). Agreements concluded
by the United States now take this form. See, e.g., Article 11(2) of the Agreement
with Bulgaria, July 2, 1963, [1963] 14 U.S.T. 969, T.I.A.S. No. 5387. See Lillich, The
United States-Bulgarian Claims Agreement of 1963, 58 Am. J. Intl L. 686, 698-700
(1964).
25. See, e.g., Article 2 of the Agreement Between the Netherlands and Yugoslavia,
July 22, 1958, [1958] Tract tenblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden No. 136, 386
U.N.T.S. 263.
26. See, e.g., Article 3 of the Agreement Between Denmark and Czechoslovakia,
Dec. 23, 1958, [1960] Lovtidende C 308.
27. FOIGHEL 246.
28. See Agreement Between the Netherlands and Yugoslavia, note 25 supra, where
the period was thirteen months.
29. Martin, The Distribution of Funds Under the Foreign Compensation Act,
1950, in 44 TRANSACT. GROT. Soc'y 243, 257-58 (1959).
819
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
owner and the eventual claimant, thus achieving the same result as the
continuity of nationality rule. Where more than two individuals figure
in the chain of title, however, this approach might permit some awards
which the continuity rule would bar.
Suppose, for example, that a British national whose property in
Poland was nationalized in 1946, had died intestate in 1950 leaving the
property to American heirs.3" If the heirs had made a bona fide assign-
ment of their rights to a British national before November 11, 1954,
the date the two countries concluded a lump sum settlement,3" the
assignee would have been able to satisfy the agreement's two-pronged
eligibility requirement as restated in Great Britian's implementing legis-
lation, 2 although quite clearly the claim would have failed had the con-
tinuity rule been applicable."3 The result clearly constitutes a desirable
departure from the traditional continuity of nationality rule followed in
past British" and present American" practice, yet it does not get to the
heart of the problem: the continued validity of the rule itself. Requiring
nationality only at the time of loss seems a far more preferable approach
than the two-pronged test since it retains the raison d'Etre of the national-
ity principle while eliminating a second, arbitrary cut-off date, thus per-
mitting claims in which a country has a valid interest initially, while pre-
30. The presumption that no attorney would be so inept as to draft a will leaving
the claim to non-British legatees unfortunately is rebuttable. Cf. FOREIGN CLAI S
SETTLEMENT CoMMISSION, SIXTEENTH SEMIANNUAL REP. 26-29 (1962).
31. Agreement Between Great Britain and Poland, Nov. 11, 1954, [1954] Gr.
Brit. T.S. No. 77 (CMD. 9343), 204 U.N.T.S. 137.
32. Sections 7(b) and 11(b) of the Polish Nationalisation Order, [1956] 1 Stat.
Instr. 1045-46 (No. 618). "Article 11(b) of the Polish Nationalization Claims Order
does not call for continuous United Kingdom ownership and its requirements are fully
satisfied so long as upon the relevant date the property was British owned." Application
of Karl Leopold Oswald Perry (BP 481, 1960).
33. See Hurst, Nationality of Claims, 7 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 162, 182 (1926).
See also FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT CommissioN, TENTH SEmIANNUAL REP. 16-17
(1959), where the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, adopting the continuous
nationality rule, explained that "'if at any time subsequent to the time of the loss, a
claim originally accruing to a United States national had become vested in a non-
national (whether by inheritance, purchase, or otherwise), the claim would not be
espoused even if it was thereafter reacquired by a United States national."' See text
at and accompanying note 35 infra.
34. See Rule II of the General Instructions for His Majesty's Foreign Service,
quoted in Sinclair, Nationality of Claims: British Practice, 27 BRIT. Y.B. INTL L.
125, 141 (1950).
35. See text accompanying note 33 supra. See also FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT
COMMISSION, suPra note 21, at 46-48, where the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission,
citing a British case similar to the example given in the text at note 30 supra, denied a
claim which had not been "owned by American nationals from the date the claim arose
to the date the Agreement was signed." Id. at 48. Although the claimant's husband had
been a United States national on the date his property was taken, a break in the
continuity of American ownership of the claim occurred when he died on April 21,
1948, approximately three months-before the United States signed an agreement with
Yugoslavia, and eight months before the claimant's naturalization.
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cluding fortunate claimants against what is often a fairly fixed sum from
receiving an increased amount attributable to the deaths of other claim-
ants before the date of settlement." Ideally, lump sum settlements should
be negotiated along such lines, as they have been occasionally in the past."
However, an equitable application of the two-pronged test at least may
mitigate the harshness of the strict continuity rule in an appropriate
situation.
One final problem not provided for in the settlement agreements
concerns the status of dual nationals. Traditional international law main-
tains that "where the person injured is a dual national, the state of the one
nationality is not entitled to espouse the claim against the state of the
other nationality."38 Since the agreements are silent on the subject, one
must look to the decisions of the various national claims commissions who
have construed them to see whether the claims of dual nationals are
allowed. Neither in Great Britain nor in the United States has dual
nationality been considered a reason for denying awards, lending support
to the view that the traditional rule may "gradually fall into disuse." 9
Should this event occur, lump sum settlements will have contributed to
the demise of a long-standing rule of customary international law.
II. ELIGIBILITY OF PARTNERSHIPS
With the trend toward the corporate form of doing business abroad,
partnership claims occur less frequently in international law than they
did in years past. Traditionally international law permitted such claims
when the members of the partnership were all nationals of the claimant
country."0 If one of the partners was the national of another state,
however, then the partnership itself was not eligible, but the remaining
partners were protected individually to the extent of their interest in the
firm. Thus, as has been stated elsewhere, "both partners and partnerships
are eligible claimants if they meet the nationality requirements.""1
Although one lump sum settlement negotiated by the United States
36. This point has been developed elsewhere. See R. LILLICH, supra note 12, at 27-29.
37. See text at and accompanying note 21 supra.
38. J. SIMpSON & H. Fox, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 106 (1959). See also Hurst,
supra note 33, at 182, and Sinclair, supra note 34, at 131,141.
39. Rode, Dual Nationals and the Doctrine of Dominant Nationality, 53 Am.
J. INT'L L. 139, 143 (1959). "The practical result in this country might be that in the
future the Government of the United States will afford protection to its citizens and
espouse their personal injury or property damage claims against foreign governments,
notwithstanding the fact that the claimants also appear to be citizens of the respondent
country."
40. Cf. J. JONES, BRITISH NATIONALITY LAW AND PRACTICE 299 n. 1 (1947).
41. R. LILi.cH & G. CHRISTENSON, supra note 11, at 15.
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mentions claims by "a partnership or an unincorporated association, '42
and the British agreements generally provide for the claims of "firms
and associations . . . constituted under the laws" of Great Britain, 3
only a relatively few settlement agreements speak in terms of claims
by "firms or associations,"" "bodids,"45 or "trading undertakings
S. ..46 while the rest are silent. Presumably this silence means that
partnership claims are handled by allowing the proportionate claims of
individual partners rather than a single claim in the partnership's name.
Confirmation of this presumption must await an examination of the
distributive process in those countries which have adjudicated claims
following lump sum settlements silent on the problem.
In Great Britain, one country whose agreements specifically speak of
claims by "firms and associations," customary international law has been
ignored and the claims of partnerships have been permitted despite the
presence of nonnational partners." This approach, equating partnerships
to corporations and refusing to "pierce the veil," is contrary to past
British practice which has held that "a firm is not an entity in English
law, and that intervention and protection can only extend to individual
British interests in a firm, not to the firm itself."48 Here, the traditional
approach appears far superior to the one developed under Great Britain's
recent lump sum settlements, since predicating eligibility upon the nation-
ality of the partners rather than the place of the firm's organization
prevents nonnationals from sharing in limited funds intended to com-
pensate only British interests.
III. ELIGIBILITY OF CORPORATIONS
In contrast to partnership claims, claims by corporations, rare before
the century's turn, have increased substantially in number in recent years.
Initially, countries espoused claims on behalf of corporations established
under their laws even where almost all the stock was owned by non-
nationals.49 This mechanical approach to corporate claims reached its
42. Article II(a) of the Agreement with Rumania, March 30, 1960, [1960] 11
U.S.T. 318, T.I.A.S. No. 4451.
43. See, e.g., Article 1(b) (ii) of the Agreement Between Great Britain and
Czechoslovakia, Sept. 28 1949, [1949] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 60 (Cmw. 7797), 86 U.N.T.S.
161.
44. See note 26 smpra.
45. Article I of the Agreement Between France and Hungary, May 14, 1965,
Decree No. 65-589 of July 15, 1965, [1965] J.0. 6308.
46. Article V of the Agreement Between Denmark and Poland, Feb. 26, 1953,
[1954] Lovtidende C 1, 186 U.N.T.S. 301.
47. See generally LILLICn, supra note 12, at 34-36.
48. See note 40 supra.
49. See Crandall, Principles of Law Applied by the Spanis Treaty Claims
Comnmnission, 4 Am. J. INT'L L. 806, 814-51 (1910).
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zenith in the prewar period with Beckett's flat assertion that "the doctrine
that the nationality of a company for the purposes of International Law
is, irrespective of the nationality of the shareholders, that of the country
under whose law it is incorporated is the one which, it seems to me, is
now really firmly established.""0 Developments during the postwar
period, especially the pattern established by numerous lump sum settle-
ments, appear to have modified, if not undercut completely, this for-
malistic attitude toward such claims.
All the settlement agreements studied have some provision to cover
claims by corporations, whether this form of doing business is contem-
plated as falling under the rubric of "legal persons,"'" "juridical . . .
persons, '5 2  "corporat persors,"'  "corporate bodieds," 4  "com-
panies,""5 or the actual term "corporations." 6 Occasionally, an addi-
tional provision is included specifying that the corporation must possess
the "nationality"' 7 or "character" 8 of the claimant country, but that
proposition apparently is so self-evident that such provisions are relatively
rare. Nationality, express or implied, always is considered the sine qua
non of eligibility, although a few agreements do contain phraseology
broad enough to permit claims by nonnational corporations. The Greek-
Yugoslav settlement, for example, speaks of mutual claims by "corporate
bodies having their main place of establishment in their respective terri-
tories,"'" while France's agreement with Poland mentions claims by
"companies under French control .... "" It is fair to say, however, that
corporations not nationals of the claimant country rarely are eligible un-
der the postwar settlement agreements.
On the other hand, these settlements, taken as a whole, reveal a
definite trend away from the prewar formalistic approach to corporate
claims and toward a functional, if not always flexible, approach designed
50. Beckett, Diplomatic Claims in Respect of Injuries to Companies, in 17
TRANSACT. GROT. Soc'Y 175, 185 (1932). But see C. PARRY, NATIONALITY AND CITIZEN-
SHIP LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH 139 (1957).
51. See note 26 supra.
52. See, e.g., Article 1 of the Agreement Between France and Rumania, Feb. 8,
1959, Dec. No. 59-439 of March 11, 1959, [1959] J.0. 3287.
53. See, e.g., Article 2 of the Agreement Between Turkey and Yugoslavia, July
13, 1956 (mimeographed).
54. See, e.g., Agreement Between Sweden and Yugoslavia, note 22 supra.
55. See, e.g., Article 4(b) of the Agreement Between France and Poland, note 18
supra.
56. See, e.g., Article 2 of the Agreement Between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia,
Feb. 11, 1956, 397 U.N.T.S. 150.
57. See, e.g., Article 2 of the Agreement Between France and Yugoslavia, April 14,
1951, Decree No. 53-653 of July 24, 1953, [1953] J.0. 6723.
58. See, e.g., Article I of the Agreement Between Sweden and Japan, Sept. 20, 1957[1958] Sveriges Overenskommelser Med Frammande Makter No. 14.
59. Article 1 (1) of the Agreement Between Greece and Yugoslavia, note 19 supra.
60. Article 4(c) of the Agreement Between France and Poland, note 18 supra.
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to protect the interests of the claimant country. Since, as Foighel rightly
notes, "international law gives no direct solution in connexion with the
question of the nationality of juridical persons,"'" countries may seek
solutions in their own municipal law, and, indeed, even are free to impose
additional requirements upon a national corporation before 'espousing or
settling its claim. True, a few countries, the most prominent being Great
Britain, still heed Beckett's call, for present "British practice regards a
British company entitled to compensation irrespective of who its share-
holders are."62 This result follows from an over-literal interpretation
of British settlement agreements by the Foreign Compensation Com-
mission.8 All the settlements define the term "British nationals" to in-
clude "companies" incorporated under English law, making no reference
to any required British interest therein, and the Commission consistently
has allowed the claims of all companies incorporated in Great Britain
without inquiry into the nationality of their stockholders. However, few
other countries judge a corporation's eligibility solely on the basis of its
place of incorporation. Most states, to quote Foighel again,
are abandoning the formal criteria without regard to whether
this involves the scope of diplomatic protection becoming
particularly wide or particularly narrow, and instead are trying
to discover what, from the viewpoint of international law, must
and ought to be the decisive elements, namely the actual interests
which lie behind the legal constructions. 4
A discussion of several tests used by countries to weigh their interest in
settling corporate claims follows.
One of the most obvious tests, the nationality of the corporation's
stockholders, has been adopted by the United States in its lump sum
settlements. Starting with the Yugoslav agreement, which in addition to
incorporation in the United States required that twenty per cent or more
of any class of the corporation's outstanding securities be owned by
individual nationals of the United States,65 the United States increased
the percentage of the corporation's outstanding capital stock or other
beneficial interest that must be owned by United States nationals to
fifty per cent.6 While this approach certainly precludes corporate claims
where a substantial American ownership interest is not involved, the
61 FOIGHEL 232.
62. Drucker, Compensation for Nationalized Property: The British Practice, 49
Am. J. INT'L L. 477, 483 (1955). See generally R. LILLIcH, supra note 12, at 36-40.
63. See, e.g., Article 3(1) (ii) of the Agreement Between Great Britain and
Bulgaria, Sept. 22, 1955, [1955] Gr. Brit T.S. No. 79 (Cim. 9625), 222 U.N.T.S. 349.
64. FOIGHEL 237.
65. Article 2(B) of the Agreement with Yugoslavia, note 15 supra.
66. See, e..g, Article II (b) of the Agreement with Rumania, note 42 supra.
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wisdom of utilizing a fixed percentage instead of a flexible standard of
substantial American interest has been questioned."7 In general, how-
ever, this approach of using an arbitrary standard has met with approval:
witness the favorable evaluation made by a former member of the
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission upon the completion of the
Yugoslav claims program:
Setting a schedule or a percentage of the total interest
involved appears to be a practical standard for such interven-
tion. Such a formula eliminates the difficult question as to what
interest shall be deemed substantial. On the other hand, a flexi-
ble measure is advantageous in hardship cases and other cases
of special merit. Gradually, the Department of State and the
Congress have been leaning toward rigid criteria rather than a
flexible yardstick. Experience has shown that this course is not
without reason."
There is little likelihood that the United States will depart radically from
the fifty per cent rule in the immediate future. 9
Another test to determine the eligibility of corporations that has
been adopted by some countries takes the sijge social of the corporation
as the controlling factor. According to White,
the sihge social of a company as that term is understood in
continental systems of law is the place where the company
exercises legal, financial and administrative control over its
operations. In France, the courts will look at the facts to deter-
mine the true si~ge if they think that the company's articles
have conferred an artificial si~ge on the company. In finding the
true si~ge the courts disregard such factors as the nationality
of the shareholders, the country where the company's exploita-
tion is carried on, and the sijge administratif if this is separate
from the main center of control."0
Agreements which embody this test have been concluded by Denmark,
whose settlement with Poland covers corporations "having their si~ge
67. Rubin has pointed out that the technique of using a fixed percentage "depends
necessarily on the arbitrary drawing of a line, and there is little more reason for a
twenty per cent than a fifteen or a fifty per cent rule." Rubin, Nationalization and
Compensation: A Comparative Approach, 17 U. CHi. L. REv. 458, 468 (1951).
68. Clay, Recent Developments in the Protection of American Shareholders'
Interests in Foreign Corporations, 45 GEo. L.J. 1, 11 (1956).
69. Cf. Article II of the Agreement with Yugoslavia, Nov. 5, 1964, [1964] 16
U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 5750.
70. WH rr 63.
825
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social in Denmark;"" by Greece, whose agreement with Yugoslavia
settles claims of corporations "having their main place of establishment"
in Greece;" '72 and by Sweden, whose settlement with Poland permits
claims by corporations "having their si~ge social in Sweden."73 More-
over, it is highly likely that other countries such as France, whose
agreements go no further than providing for the claims of "French
companies," 74 use this eligibility test.75
Even when the corporation is a national of the claimant country
and has its sijge social there, many settlement agreements impose an
additional requirement before deeming it an eligible claimant. Starting
with Switzerland's agreement with Yugoslavia," settlements by Bel-
gium," Italy"8 and Sweden"9 have provided that, in addition to having
its sijge social in the respective country, a claimant corporation also
must show that it has, say, a preponderant Swiss interest."0 In many
instances, of course, this requirement is satisfied by an examination of
the nationality of the corporation's stockholders, but other factors often
are relevant too. Bindschedler has revealed an aide-memoire to the above
Swiss agreement which sets forth that country's approach to the problem
of corporate claimants:
In the majority of cases a 'predominant Swiss interest'
will be manifest when the effective majority of the subscribers
of capital are Swiss. If there is no majority, it is a matter
71. See note 46 supra. A subsequent settlement reverts to the test "of Danish
nationality. . . ." See note 26 supra. "Here, therefore, importance is attached solely to
formal nationality." FoIGHEL 236.
72. Article 1(1) of the Agreement Between Greece and Yugoslavia, note 19
supra.
73. Article 5 of the Agreement Between Sweden and Poland, Nov. 16, 1949,
[1950] Sveriges Overenskommelser Med Frammande Makter No. 52.
74. See, e.g., Article 4(b) of the Agreement Between France and Poland, note 18
supra. See text at note 70 supra.
75. But see text at note 71 supra. "[I]t can only be said that existing practice in
national legislation is naturally reflected in the claims for compensation which have been
settled." FOIGHEL 232.
76. Article 5 of the Agreement Between Switzerland and Yugoslavia, Sept. 27,
1948, [1948] Amtl. Samml. 1007. "The later Swiss agreements, i.e. those concluded with
Hungary, Roumania, and Bulgaria have discarded the test of location of the siege
altogether in favour of the sole test of a preponderant Swiss interest." WHITE 63 n. 38.
77. See note 22 supra.
78. Article 2 of the Agreement Between Italy and Yugoslavia, May 23, 1949, 150
U.N.T.S. 181.
79. Article 2 of the Agreement Between Sweden and Hungary, March 31, 1951,
[1951] Sveriges Overenskommelser Med Frammande Makter No. 16. A subsequent
settlement reverts to the test of "Swedish nationality. . . ." See FoIGHI.. 236.
80. "Sweden regarded either of these factors as sufficient to found a claim to
compensation under her agreement with Hungary. Article 2 defined Swedish assets,
rights and interests as those belonging to Swedish natural persons and to juridical
persons or commercial companies the headquarters of which were in Sweden or which
were a predominantly Swedish interest." WHITE 63-64. See note 79 supra.
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of determining the minority which exercises control on the com-
pany; this is especially easy to establish when a compact
minority is faced with a scattered majority. The composition of
the board of management (counseil d'administration) or of
the directorate may also be decisive when it falls to them to
determine the policy and take the decisions of the company.
Finally, in certain cases the creditors must not be ignored, for
they may exercise a certain influence over the enterprise. But
it is always necessary to take the actual circumstances of each
case into account and not rely upon purely legal fictions.8
In this writer's opinion the final sentence of the above quotation, mani-
festing the strong postwar trend away from the rigid Anglo-American
place-of-incorporation rule that held sway before World War II, re-
presents the correct approach to the handling of corporate claims.
IV. ELIGIBILITY OF STOCKHOLDERS
In view of the forthcoming decision in the Barcelona Traction
Case,"2 now pending before the International Court of Justice, any
evaluation of the standing of stockholder claims in international law
must be highly tentative in character. Nevertheless, the pattern revealed
by an examination of recent lump sum settlements is sufficiently definite
to hazard a few predictions in this developoing area of international law.
Indeed, since stockholder claims began to attain significance about the
time international claims commissions began their eclipse, one really
must look to these settlement agreements to determine the attitude of
states toward the claims of stockholders. In order to sort out the different
types of claims based upon stockholding, it is useful to review briefly
the history of such claims.
Until the beginning of this century, stockholders had little protec-
tion under international law. The Department of State, for instance, first
took no interest in the claims of United States stockholders in foreign
corporations, but since World War I it "has shown an increasing
interest in espousing the claims of American stockholders who have
made foreign investments."83 A 1923 decision of the Mixed Claims
Commission, United States and Germany, "was apparently the first
formal recognition . . . of the right of stockholders to obtain relief for
war damage to their interests in foreign corporations."8 The Special
81. Bindschedler, Recent Decisions in Switzerland-II, 3 INT'L & ComB. L.Q. 512,
515 (1954).
82. Case of the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd., [1964] I.CJ. 131.
83. Clay, supra note 68, at 6.
84. Id. at 13.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Mexican Claims Commission, a national commission established in 1934
to distribute a lump sufn settlement received from Mexico,"9 was the
first such commission given jurisdiction to consider claims of United
States nationals based upon damage to foreign corporations "in which
citizens of the United States have or have had a substantial and bona
fide interest."86 This "substantial and bona fide interest" test was
utilized a decade later by the American-Mexican Claims Commission, a
national commission set up following a subsequent settlement agreement
with Mexico,"7 which adjudicated numerous claims of United States
stockholders in Mexican corporations.8
The rationale for the allowance of such claims is apparent. When an
individual or corporate stockholder is a United States national owning
stock in an American corporation which suffers a compensable loss
abroad, the latter's corporate claim precludes any possible claim on the
stockholder's part.89 However, if the corporation is. an ineligible claim-
ant, either because it was incorporated in the nationalizing country or
in a third state,9 failure to "pierce the corporate veil" would deprive
the stockholder of any possibility of recovery. In such circumstances, the
trend has been to disregard the corporate fiction and protect the stock-
holder to the extent of his proportionate interest in the injured or
nationalized corporation.9' As White observes, "shareholders' rights in
companies possessing the nationality of the respondent State can be
protected by their own national State where the injury is of such a nature
as to terminate the existence of the legal person, or to render it defunct
85. Convention with Mexico, April 24, 1934, 49 Stat. 3071, T.S. No. 878.
86. This legal standard was incorporated by reference from the Convention with
Mexico, Sept. 10, 1923, 43 Stat. 1723, T.S. No. 676.
87. Convention with Mexico, Nov. 19, 1941, 56 Stat. 1347, T.S. No. 980.
88. See, e.g., American-Mexican Claims Commission, Report to the Secretary of
State 623 (1948). See also Domke, "Piercing the Corporate Veil" i the Law of
Economic Warfare, 1955 Wis. L. REv. 77, 84 n. 37.
89. Cf. FOIGaar 238. An exception occurs when the American corporation does not
meet the eligibility requirements for corporate claimants, i.e., fails to meet the fifty
per cent standard. See text at note 66 supra and text at and accompanying note 90 infra.
90. It also may be ineligible because it failed to meet the fifty per cent test
despite the fact it was incorporated in the United States. See text accompanying note 89
supra.
91. Such is the trend, at least, if the corporation was incorporated under the laws
of the nationalizing country. FoiGHEL 238-42. One authoritative work, written in 1949
and specifically excluding treaty practice, limits the right of protection to cases
"where the corporation is a national of the state oppressing it. It may be that the same
consideration [the lack of any effective remedy by corporate action] will permit the
extension of the exception to cases where the corporation is iwt such a national, and the
shareholders cannot reasonably be said to possess any effective remedy other than the
intervention of their own Government. It cannot be said, however, that such an extension
has, as yet, been sanctioned by international practice." Jones, Claims on Behalf of
Nationals Who are Shareholders in Foreign Companies, 26 BIT. Y.B. INT'L. L. 225, 257-
58 (1949). See text at note 92 infra.
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for all practical purposes."9 2 And even Friedman, hardly a staunch
supporter of private property, acknowledges that in such cases "inter-
national law deliberately sacrifices the unitary conception of legal per-
sonality which regards corporations as having a single nationality in order
to look beyond the legal forms and to determine the interests and the
parties actually suffering injury.""
Examining the postwar lump sum settlements, one must agree with
White that "nearly all of the compensation agreements covered the claims
of shareholders," 4 at least insofar as claims based upon direct stock
interests in nationalized corporations of taking states were concerned.
Some agreements, such as the United States-Polish settlement, describe
in great detail the various classes of compensable stockholder claims."
Others, such as the settlement between the Netherlands and Yugoslavia,
expressly state that the claims settled include "all Netherlands interests
in the form of direct or indirect participation in enterprises in Yugosla-
via."" Finally, many agreements, notably the ones concluded by Great
Britain, merely intimate that such claims may have been contemplated by
defining the property for which compensation is being paid as property
owned "directly or indirectly" by nationals of the claimant country."
Although the United States, in its agreement with Yugoslavia,
rejected the "substantial and bona fide interest" test and permitted the
claims of United States nationals holding stock in Yugoslav corporations
regardless of the extent of American interest in a corporation, 8 not all
countries have taken this approach. In an early settlement with Poland,
France did provide for the payment of claims of persons "having a
minority share, however small, in all other [non-French] companies,""
92. WHiTE 69, citing Jones, supra note 91, at 257. Accord, WORTLEY, EXPROPRiATION
IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 11-12 (1959). See also Drucker, The Confiscation of
Corporations and the Conflict of Laws, 234 L.T. 355 (1963).
93. S. FRIEImAN, EXPRoPRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 171 (1953).
94. WHITE 69. "The post-war treaty practice has shown that the States of Eastern
Europe, at any rate, did not seek to rely on the corporate fagade to the detriment of
foreign interests, but that they were prepared to recognise the claim of shareholders to
benefit under the compensation agreements." Id. at 70.
95. See Annex A of the Agreement with Poland, July 16, 1960, [1960] 11 U.S.T.
1953, T.I.A.S. No. 4545.
96. See note 25 supra. See also note 56 supra.
97. See, e.g., Article 4(1) of the Agreement Between Great Britain and Hungary,
June 27, 1956, [1956] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 30 (CaiD. 9820), 249 U.N.T.S. 19. See also
notes 26 and 73 supra.
98. Article 2(C) of the Agreement with Yugoslavia, note 15 supra. A stockholder
who owned but a few shares in a Yugoslav corporation thus was compensated. See
Clay, supra note 68, at 15. This approach has been followed in subsequent agreements.
See generally R. LILHi.c & G. CHmsTENSON, supra note 11, at 18-20.
99. Article 4(d) of the Agreement Between France and Poland, note 18 supra.
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and Great Britain also has adhered to this test uniformly.' 0 However,
subsequent French agreements have allowed stockholder claims only if
French claimants hold "a share of at least fifty per cent in these same
companies,"1 1 while a similar provision to the effect that "Netherlands
individuals or corporate bodies holding majority shares in companies
incorporated under Yugoslav law . . . shall be compensated for their
vested right to claim against these companies" is found in a recent
Dutch-Yugoslav agreement." 2 The Anglo-American approach appears
to predominate, but at this stage it is still too early to speak authorita-
tively on this unsettled question.
One final problem deserves mention, namely, stockholder claims
through corporations of a third state. The United States first allowed
such "indirect claims" under the Yugoslav agreement,"0 3 and it con-
tinues to permit them subject to a twenty-five per cent American owner-
ship interest requirement.' Neither Great Britain' nor, apparently,
the continental countries00 permit these claims, and the authorities
appear to be evenly divided as to whether they should be allowed.
Enough writers have taken a negative stand.0 7 to require a revision of
Nial's observation that "occasionally the idea has been expressed that the
right of intervention on behalf of shareholders exists only when the
damage has been caused by the state of incorporation or domicil."' 8
Calling this supposed distinction "too formalistic and therefore not
convincing,"'0 0 he agrees with Wortley that "when the State of incor-
poration refuses to give diplomatic protection, then the shareholders
100. See R. LmLIcH, supra note 12, at 42.
101. Article 1(b) of the Additional Protocol No. 1 to the Agreemen Between
France and Czechoslovakia, note 14 supra. While Article 2 of the Agreement Between
France and Yugoslavia, supra note 57, permits claims for "all French interests in
Yugoslav enterprises," see Weston, supra note 13, at 856, Article 5(2)(3) seems to
require a majority French interest in a Yugoslav corporation as a condition precedent
to a stockholder's claim.
102. Article 5(2) of the Agreement Between the Netherlands and Yugoslavia,
note 25 supra.
103. "For example, if an American national owned five per cent of the stock of a
Swiss corporation, which in turn owned the stock of a Yugoslav corporation, the property
of which was nationalized, the American national would be an eligible claimant against
the fund." Rubin, supra note 67, at 466. But see FOIGHEL 238-39. Compare Bagge,
Intervention on the Ground of Damage Caused to Nationals, with Particular Reference
to Exhaustioa of Local Remedies and the Rights of Shareholders, 34 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
162, 170-75 passin (1958), with R. LILIICi, supra note 12, at 44-46.
104. Id. at 42 n. 85.
105. Id. at 42-47, 49-52.
106. See FOIGHEL 238-40.
107. Id. See also text at and accompanying notes 91-92 supra.
108. Nial, A Confribution to the Question of the Protection of Limited Companies
in the Law of Nations (Hague Academy of International Law), 101 RECUEIL DES
CouRs 311, 320 (1960-11I).
109. Id. at 321.
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may rightly look to their own Governments for diplomatic assistance."""
This writer endorses Nial's analysis, yet admits that his view finds little
support in the non-American lump sum settlements under study. Perhaps
the problem can be summed up succinctly by quoting Jones's plaintive no-
tation: "Another point on which the law is uncertain is the position
where the shares of the foreign corporation are held by other companies
which in turn are held in whole or in part by other companies-all com-
panies possibly of different nationalities.""'
V. CONCLUSION
It was stated at the outset of this article that little attention had been
paid to the ninety-odd lump sum agreements which have settled most of
the international claims that have arisen since World War II, and to the
effect these settlements may be having on customary international law
norms. While, in the areas of individual and partnership claims, their
impact has not been startling, they appear to have rewritten the law
governing corporate and stockholder claims almost de novo. At the very
least, international lawyers, whether in private practice or foreign offices,
should be familiar with these agreements. Properly appreciated, they
should exert a heavy influence on state practice and hence contribute to
the creation and clarification of the norms governing this developing area
of customary international law.
110. WORTLEY, supra note 92, at 144. Indeed, Nial apparently goes beyond
Wortley in urging protection when the third state "intervenes in a way that does not
properly guard the interests of the company. .. ." Nial, supra note 108, at 321.
111. Jones, supra note 91, at 258 n. 1.
